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Abstract
It has been argued that the institutions of the CFA Franc zone may
have reduced in°ation but that they also induced misalignment of the real
exchange rate and that this is the explanation for their dismal revenue
performance. This paper uses a panel of 22 countries in sub-Saharan
Africa to estimate revenue performance over the period from 1980 to 1996.
It ¯nds that the poor cumulative relative revenue performance of the
franc zone countries is mainly attributable to di®erences in environmental
and structural factors, and to their di®erent responses to changes in the
equilibrium real exchange rate, but that the misalignment of the real
exchange rate also played a part.
1 Introduction
During the 1980s and early 1990s the countries of the CFA Franc zone experi-
enced a steady decline in the ratio of tax to GDP, from almost 15 percent of
GDP in the early 1980s to only 11.5% in the early 1990s. By contrast, over the
same period the tax yield in countries outside the zone remained remarkably
stable at around 15.5%. Following the devaluation of the CFA Franc in January
1994, the decline in the tax ratio halted and there is evidence of a slight recovery
by 1996. This pattern of relative decline in the CFA zone is repeated for each
of the major components of total tax revenue namely income taxes, domestic
indirect taxes and taxes on international trade ( See Figure 1 and Table 1).1
**** Table 1 here ****
¤This paper draws on earlier work by the authors (Adam et al, 1998) examining revenue
productivity over the 1980s. We are grateful to Ludivico Carraro for valuable research assis-
tance and to Steve O'Connell and an anonymous referee for comments on an earlier version
of this paper.
yDepartment of Economics, University of Oxford (Adam and Bevan) CERDI, Universit_ e
d'Auvergne (Chambas).
1Throughout this paper we are basing our inference on a sample of countries in SSA, not on
the population. This partly re°ects data availability but we also intentionally exclude countries
whose tax base is dominated by natural resources - notably the oil-producing countries. A
complete description of the data and sample is provided in the Data Appendix.
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A natural question is whether these di®erences can be explained solely in
terms of a di®erent evolution of the determinants of revenue productivity or
whether the two groups of countries di®er in a more fundamental sense. A
substantial literature has explored how the institutional characteristics of the
zone may have contributed to a distinctive macroeconomic response to external
events. This literature argues that the mechanism guaranteeing the convertibil-
ity of the CFA Franc, the overdraft facility provided by the Banque de France,
relieves the domestic economy of the obligation to adjust to external disequilib-
ria, at least in the short to medium term. It has been suggested that whilst this
structure successfully delivered low in°ation and high growth in the early 1980s,
the in°exibility it imparted to the domestic price system retarded adjustment to
deteriorating external circumstances in the late 1980s and 1990s. Thus domestic
price in°exibility contributed to the emergence of large and persistent misalign-
ment of the real exchange rate relative to its equilibrium level in the CFA zone,
long after other economies of sub-Saharan Africa had established more °exible
exchange rate arrangements (see for example de Melo and Devarajan, 1991).
Nashashibi and Bazzoni (1994) develop this argument, conjecturing that:
\a major factor in the deterioration of ¯scal performance in the
¯xed-rate [i.e. CFA] countries during the second half of the 1980s
was that the real exchange rate increasingly diverged from its equi-
librium path. Conversely, the variable rate countries were able to
improve their ¯scal performance because their real exchange rate
was converging towards its equilibrium path." [pp 118-19].
In this paper we subject this conjecture to econometric scrutiny by conduct-
ing an empirical investigation of revenue performance in sub-Saharan Africa
for the period from 1980-1996. The paper follows in the tradition of Heller
(1975) and Leuthold (1996) and corresponds quite closely to a recent paper by
2Ghura (1998) which examines the impact of macroeconomic policy choices and
of measures of corruption on total revenue productivity for the period 1985-
96. Ghura's work partially supports the Nashashibi and Bazzoni view by ¯nd-
ing signi¯cant di®erences between CFA and non-CFA countries { re°ected in a
signi¯cant group-speci¯c intercept shift { but she ¯nds no signi¯cant role for
changes in the real exchange rate or its fundamentals. Although we use a similar
data set we are able to examine more closely the role of the real exchange rate
by adopting a less restrictive econometric speci¯cation and by disaggregating
total tax revenue into its principal components which, from a theoretical per-
spective, may be expected to respond di®erently to the real exchange rate and
its determinants.2
This approach allows us to address two key issues not addressed in earlier
work. First, since our sample spans the period from 1980 to 1996 we can ex-
plicitly test a time-invariant common model of revenue performance against an
alternative model in which the transmission from external and policy factors to
revenue performance di®ers between the two regimes and over time. Of par-
ticular interest, of course, is whether the CFA devaluation of 1994 has altered
revenue productivity in the zone. Second, by estimating an explicit model for
the evolution of the equilibrium real exchange rate, we can distinguish between
the response of tax revenue to the misalignment of the real exchange rate as
opposed to equilibrium movements in it.
Our empirical strategy is not without limitations. As with most studies of
revenue performance, we lack reliable information on the evolving structure of
the tax system, hence our analysis is restricted to crude tax yields. However,
while it is not possible directly to control for changes in the tax regime, panel
data methods do allow us to control for unobservable time-invariant country-
speci¯c characteristics determining revenue performance, which will include
amongst other features the general stance of the tax system (see also Leuthold,
1996). A second limitation is that we are unable to distinguish between the
e®ects of the di®erent institutional elements of the CFA zone, for example the
e®ect of the ¯xed nominal exchange rate and the e®ect of guaranteed convert-
ibility. At best, therefore, we are able to comment on the net e®ect on revenue
productivity of the CFA institutions as a whole rather than directly on the role
of the nominal exchange rate regime itself (although our focus on the real ex-
change rate and the in°ation rate means that we do control for some of the
implications of the regime).
To set the stage, we start with a brief presentation of the data including
some preliminary estimates of the buoyancy of the tax system. This is followed
in Section 3 with a simple model of revenue performance which identi¯es the
role of the real exchange rate and its determinants (the so-called fundamentals).
A complication for the empirical analysis is that these `fundamentals' may have
a direct impact on revenue productivity as well as an indirect one via their
e®ect on the exchange rate. The model thus provides a framework within which
2In contrast to Ghura's 39 country unbalanced panel, our analysis is limited to the balanced
panel investigated by Nashashibi and Bazzoni although the time dimension is extended to cover
the period from 1980-96. We examine the three principal components of tax revenue only but
exclude non-tax revenue. As Table 1 shows, while non-tax revenue in the non-CFA countries
has been realtively stable over time, there has been a sharp collapse in non-tax revenue in
the CFA zone. This re°ects in the main factors beyond the scope of this paper such as the
the reform of the caisse de stabilisation and other marketing boards which have played a
signi¯cant role in public sector operations in the zone.
3these e®ects can be disentangled in the empirical application. Section 4 presents
the results from the estimated revenue and real exchange rate equations while
Section 5 concludes with a summary of the results.
2 Preliminary evidence
The countries in our sample share a broadly common structure of production
where agriculture accounts for around 35 percent of GDP, industry and min-
ing for around 20 percent, and have been subject to similar external terms of
trade developments, especially during the 1980s (see Table 2 and Figure 2).
But here the similarities end. The reaction to these broadly similar external
conditions di®ered in interesting ways and, it would appear, with very di®erent
consequences. Although the real exchange rate depreciated by the same amount
over the period as a whole, the evolution was very di®erent. Whereas the aver-
age real exchange rate for the non-CFA countries depreciated steadily up until
1993 (and then appreciated slightly) that for the CFA zone remained relatively
overvalued until the devaluation of the CFA franc in January 1994.3 A similar
pattern is re°ected in the evolution of the aid °ow: both groups enjoyed an
increase in net aid in°ows as a percent of GDP. However, since these data are
expressed in domestic currency terms, they also re°ect movements in the real
exchange rate, as can be seen from Figure 2. In foreign currency terms the net
aid °ow to both groups of country was much more stable over time. Another re-
lated di®erence is that whereas over time the non-CFA economies became more
open to trade, the opposite was happening in the CFA zone, with this again
being reversed after the devaluation in 1994.4 The ¯nal feature of the data is
a direct re°ection of the nominal exchange rate regime: with the exception of
the jump in domestic prices around the devaluation, the CFA countries have
enjoyed consistently lower in°ation than the non-CFA countries.
The most striking di®erence, however, is in the evolution of average real per
capita income. Despite virtually identical population growth over the period,
per capita incomes in the CFA zone declined steadily throughout the period
until 1993, both absolutely and relative to the non-CFA countries where, by
contrast per capita incomes have risen steadily over the same period.
**** Table 2 here ****
3Note that the real exchange index in Figure 2 is normalized so that 1980=100. By contrast
the data in Table 2 are normalized to 100 over the period 1980-85.
4As with the measure of aid °ows, movements in this measure of openness (i.e. the trade
share in GDP) also re°ect the consequences of real exchange rate changes which revalue the
tradable relative to non-tradable components of GDP.
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To complete our discussion of the data we report preliminary estimates of the
buoyancy of the tax structure across the two country groupings. The buoyancy






= ® +¯1lnyit +¯2(lnyit ¤ cfa) + st +"it (1)
where (t=y) denotes the tax yield, y denotes per capita GDP in constant prices,
and cfa is a dummy variable taking the value of one if the country is a member
of the CFA zone. We also add a vector of time dummy variables, denoted st, to
control for common time-varying e®ects. The error term follows the standard
one-way error speci¯cation
"it = ¹i + ºit (2)
providing the opportunity to control for country-speci¯c e®ects. Table 3 reports
the results of estimating equation (1) for total taxes and each of the tax compo-
nents (where, for convenience, we have suppressed the coe±cients on the time
dummy variables).
5Table 3: Estimated Tax Buoyancy
OLS (Fixed E®ects) Estimation. Sample: 1980-1996
total tax income tax indirect tax trade tax
constant -0.327 -0.164 -0.195 0.035
[4.88] [5.60] [4.43] [0.82]
ln y 0.037 0.027 0.041 -0.032
[3.32] [5.63] [5.62] [4.59]
lny*cfa 0.117 0.024 0.002 0.093
[4.77] [2.268] [0.15] [5.98]
Adjusted-R2 0.178 0.147 0.114 0.236
F-pooling 71.81 130.53 32.73 34.86
Prob [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
n 373 373 373 373
Note: R2 denotes within-group coe±cient of determination.
t-statistics in parentheses. F-pooling denotes F test of country-speci¯c e®ects.
Note that since the dependent variable is a tax share the coe±cient on lnyit
measures the (percentage) deviation from a unit tax buoyancy. These estimates
point to two important features of the data. First, for the non-CFA countries,
rising real per capita GDP leads to a rising total tax ratio but the composition of
total tax is skewed away from trade taxes towards domestic income and indirect
taxes. Second, with the exception of domestic indirect taxes, the tax system in
the CFA zone appears to be signi¯cantly more buoyant than that in countries
outside the zone. This implies a gearing-up of the revenue consequences of
growth di®erentials between the groups of countries. Hence the decline in per
capita GDP over the period in the CFA zone (both absolutely and relative to
the non-CFA countries) seen in Figure 2 translates into the rapid decline in
total revenue in the CFA zone and the widening di®erential between zone and
non-zone countries up until around 1993. It is important to note, however,
that the di®erential in these crude buoyancy measures implies that revenue will
recover more rapidly in the CFA than elsewhere as real per capita incomes rise.
However, the simple buoyancy equations explain a relatively small proportion
of the variation in revenue productivity, as indicated by the R2 indicators. To
address this problem, and to unravel these crude buoyancy results we therefore
move to a more comprehensive discussion of revenue productivity, starting with
an examination of the link between the real exchange rate, its determinants,
and revenue yields.
3 Tax productivity and the real exchange rate
Standard measures of revenue productivity express the tax °ow in terms of GDP
where, typically, both are measured in terms of current domestic currency. As
a consequence there are two channels through which real exchange rate deter-
minants (the `fundamentals') may a®ect revenue. On the one hand, changes in
the fundamentals directly alter the size and composition of the tax base. For
example, balance of payments support may increase the total volume of imports
and hence the level and composition of aggregate demand relative to GDP. The
6precise manner in which aggregate demand alters depends on consumer pref-
erences and the structure of production. To the extent that the tax structure
is not uniform across components of aggregate demand, this will alter the tax
yield ceteris paribus. On the other hand, an increase in balance of payments
support will alter the real exchange rate. This relative price e®ect has an im-
pact on the revenue yield independent of the direct quantity e®ect as long as the
relevant tax base has a composition (between tradable and non-tradable goods)
di®erent from that of GDP. For example, a real exchange rate depreciation will
increase the domestic value of trade taxes relative to taxes levied on domestic
production, when these taxes are levied ad valorem.
This presents an empirical problem when we seek to estimate revenue yields.
In a fully reduced form, where we substitute the real exchange rate by its fun-
damentals, the coe±cients on the fundamentals will re°ect a composite of the
direct and indirect (or relative price) e®ects. Hence in order to highlight both
direct and indirect e®ects we estimate a \semi-reduced form" in which the real
exchange and its determinants jointly enter the tax equations. In the follow-
ing section we develop a simple model to illustrate this point. In doing so
we distinguish three taxes, taxes on total GDP (our \income tax"), taxes on
non-tradables (our \domestic indirect tax") and a tari® on imports (our \trade
tax"). To simplify the analysis we assume that there are no domestic savings,
investment or intermediate goods in the economy, and factors of production are
¯xed in supply and fully employed.
3.1 The model
We examine a small open economy facing world prices of PX and PM for its
exports and imports, that produces and consumes a non-traded domestic good
with price PN. Exports are not consumed at home and there is no competing
production of imports. However imports attract a tari®. Capital stocks are
sector-speci¯c while labour, denoted L; moves between sectors to equalize real
consumption wages. Public expenditure is ¯nanced through the three (distor-
tionary) taxes: t on private sector production; d on non-tradable production
and consumption; and the tari® on imports, Á. Relative prices are de¯ned in










where ¿ denotes the tari® and an increase in Q denotes an appreciation. The










= T(1 ¡ Á) (4)
where T = PX=P ¤
M is the (exogenously determined) small country's terms of
trade in international markets, and Á = ¿=(P¤
M + ¿) is the tari® expressed as a
proportion of the tari® inclusive price.
Equilibrium holds when aggregate spending equals aggregate income at full
employment and the trade balance is equal to the exogenous aid in°ow (for
simplicity we assume there are no private international capital movements or
7changes in reserves). Using revenue and expenditure functions (see Dixit and
Norman, 1980), and denoting public and private expenditure functions and
utility by lower- and upper-case letters respectively, we express this relationship
as:
e(PN;PM;u) +E(PN;PM;U) = R(PN;PX;L) + PMA: (5)
There is no government production in this economy: the government simply
consumes the imported and non-tradable goods, although its preferences are
not necessarily the same as those of the private sector. For convenience we
normalize on the domestic price of imports (PM) and re-express (5) as
e(Q;1;u) +E(Q;1;U) = R(Q;T(1 ¡Á);L) +A (6)
where A is aid measured in units of imports, and u and U denote public and
private sector utility.5 By the properties of the revenue and expenditure func-
tions, letting subscripts denote partial derivatives with respect to the relevant
arguments, we can express the supply and compensated demand functions for
non-traded goods as RQ , eQ and EQ respectively, leading to market-clearing
condition in the non-traded goods market
eQ(Q;1;u) +EQ(Q;1;U) = RQ(Q;T(1 ¡ Á);L); (7)
By Walras Law, (6) and (7) imply equilibrium in the tradable goods sector.
GDP measured in imported goods is:
R = QRQ +T(1 ¡ Á)RT (8)
where RT represents the supply of tradable goods. Public expenditure is ¯-
nanced through a tax on private sector income (excluding net aid in°ows), the
domestic sales tax and the tari® on imports. With no changes in foreign reserves
and aid as the only capital in°ow then the tax base for tari® revenue can be
expressed in terms of the capacity to import (i.e. total exports plus aid valued
at domestic import prices). Finally we allow for Tanzi e®ects so that the ac-
tual real revenue yield from each tax instrument is a (negative) function of the
in°ation rate, ¼. Tanzi e®ects are assumed to di®er across the three taxes and
are denoted ®(¼) , ¯(¼) and °(¼) respectively for income taxes, indirect taxes,
and trade taxes. These Tanzi e®ects represent the only price non-homogeneity
in the model. Thus, with a balanced government budget, we de¯ne the rev-
enue/expenditure of the public sector as
e(Q;1;u) = t(1 ¡®(¼))(QRQ + T(1 ¡Á)RT) + d(1 ¡¯(¼))QRQ (9)
+Á(1 ¡°(¼))(T(1 ¡Á)RT + A):
3.1.1 Tax yields
We can use this simple structure to express the three tax yields in terms of
the (import) real exchange rate, the terms of trade, aid in°ows and in°ation.
5Note also that under this normalization we have P ¤
M + ¿ = 1 and hence Á = ¿.
8De¯ning the revenue yield for each tax as Yi for i = t; d; and Á, we obtain:
Yt =





QRQ + T(1 ¡Á)RT
YÁ =
Á(1 ¡ °(¼))(T(1¡ Á)RT +A)
QRQ +T(1 ¡ Á)RT
:
Totally di®erentiating these revenue yields we get the following expressions for
the evolution of the component tax yields, under the assumption that the tax
rates are ¯xed at t , d and Á:6 For convenience we de¯ne the own- and cross-price














Denoting the non-tradable component of GDP by n = QRQ and the tradable
component as s = (1¡Á)TRT, the total derivatives for each tax component are
as follows:
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(n +s)2 dQ
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for tari®s. Although these expressions appear rather complicated it is possible
to derive the following results under weak assumptions concerning the relative
strength of own- and cross-price elasticities of supply.
6We do not examine the case where these rates are allowed to vary since in our empirical
work we do not have data on explicit tax rates.
9Remark 1 [In°ation]. For ®¼ , ¯¼ , and °¼ > 0 an increase in in°ation
reduces all tax yields.
Remark 2 [Real Exchange Rate]. (i) When the own-price elasticity of
supply for non-tradables is su±ciently large relative to the cross-price elasticity,
such that (1 + ¾QQ) > ¾TQ, an appreciation in the (import) real exchange
rate, denoted by a rise in Q, increases the yield from domestic indirect taxes,
and vice versa for a real exchange rate depreciation; (ii) when the own-price
elasticity of supply is su±ciently large relative to cross-price e®ects, and the
share of non-tradables in total GDP is not too large, such that (1 + ¾QQ) >
¾TQ(1 ¡ Á)(n ¡ A)=(s + A), an appreciation in the import real exchange rate
decreases the yield from trade taxes, and vice versa for a real exchange rate
depreciation; (iii) movements in the real exchange rate have no impact on the
income tax yield.
Remark 3 [Terms of Trade]. (i) When the own-price elasticity of supply
for tradables is su±ciently large relative to cross-price elasticity, such that (1+
¾TT) > ¾QT, an improvement in the terms of trade, denoted by an increase
in T; will reduce the yield from domestic indirect taxes and vice versa for a
deterioration in the terms of trade; (ii) when the own-price elasticity of supply
for tradables is su±ciently large relative to cross-price e®ects and the share of
tradables in total GDP is not too large, such that (1+¾TT) > ¾QT(s+A)=((1¡
Á)(n ¡ A)), an improvement in the terms of trade will improve the trade tax
yield and vice versa for a deterioration in the terms of trade; (iii) movements
in the terms of trade have no impact on the income tax yield.
Remark 4 [Aid]. An increase in the aid °ow will have no impact on income
taxes or domestic indirect tax yields but will lead to an increase in the trade tax
yield.
These remarks highlight the anticipated di®erential responses of the compo-
nents of total tax revenue to external and policy factors. It is clear that the net
e®ect on total taxation will re°ect the incidence of taxation and the composition
of the tax base between the tradable and non-tradable components of domestic
production and the level of aid.
3.1.2 The real exchange rate
So far we have taken the real exchange rate as parametric to the revenue equa-
tions. However it is useful to examine the properties of the real exchange rate
itself. To do so we take the total di®erential of equations (6), (7) and (9) and
solve for the three endogenous variables dQ , du , and dU in terms of the
strictly exogenous variables (see Appendix for derivation). The solution for the
real exchange rate is given by
dQ = ((1 ¡Á(1 ¡ °(¼)))Dy +Á(1 ¡ °(¼))dy]©dA (14)
+[Dy((1 ¡¿2)(1 ¡ Á)RT ¡ ¿1QRT ¡ T(1 ¡Á)RTT)
+dy(¿2(1 ¡ Á)RT + ¿1QRT + T(1 ¡Á)RTT) ¡ (1 ¡Á)RTQ]©dT
+[(t®¼ +d¯¼)QRQ + (t®¼ + Á°¼)T(1 ¡ Á)RT + Á°¼A](dy ¡Dy)©d¼
10where Dy = EQU=EU and dy = eQu=eu are the \Marshallian" income elastici-
ties of demand for non-tradable goods by the private and public sector respec-
tively, © = (RQQ ¡eQQ ¡EQQ) > 0 and ¿1 and ¿2 are the average tax rate on
the tradable and non-tradable components of output, t(1¡®(¼))+d(1¡¯(¼))
and t(1 ¡ ®(¼)) + Á(1 ¡ °(¼)) respectively. Although this is a cumbersome
expression it is easy to see that if public and private demand functions for
non-tradables exhibit the same income elasticity so that Dy = dy we get the
following expression:
dQ = Dy©dA+©(1 ¡ Á)[DyRT ¡RTQ]dT: (15)
This expression summarises the following key results. First, we get the stan-
dard result that an increase in aid unambiguously appreciates the import real
exchange rate (assuming that non-tradable goods are normal goods). Second,
the e®ect of an improvement in the terms of trade depends on the whether the
income or substitution e®ect dominates. If the income e®ect dominates then
DyRT > RQT so that the second term is positive, indicating a real exchange
rate appreciation. The third result is that under the restriction that Dy = dy
changes in the rate of in°ation have no impact on the real exchange rate. In
this model there is long-run price homogeneity so that in°ation represents a
pure transfer from the public to the private sector through the operation of
the Tanzi e®ect. With equal income elasticities of demand in both sectors the
real exchange rate consequences of the transfer are neutralized. Clearly if the
assumption Dy = dy is relaxed the model admits a role for in°ation.
Equations (11) to (15) provide a summary of a \semi-reduced form" speci-
¯cation for the tax yields and the real exchange rate which we now proceed to
estimate.
4 The empirical model
We estimate empirical counterparts to (11 , 12, and 13) within a dynamic panel













it + uit: (16)
Our sample consists of annual observations over the period 1980-1996 for a panel
of 22 countries. A number of points need to be made about the model. First,






where j denotes income taxes, ytax y;
domestic indirect taxes, itax y consisting of domestic sales taxes and excise
duties, taxes on international trade, ttax y; and the aggregate, total tax revenue,
txrev y. The split between itax y and ttax y attempts to mirror the theoretical
distinction between taxes on non-tradables and tradables. The distinction is not
well maintained in practice: in many regimes domestic taxes are levied on traded
goods on top of the explicit trade duties. In the limit, if all domestic indirect
taxation was of this form, we would expect the revenue functions for these two
components of the tax share to behave in a similar fashion. By contrast, the
11greater the share of `pure' non-tradables in the tax base, the more the behaviour
of the two components will di®er.
Second, the vector X0
it of explanatory variables includes the factorsdiscussed
in the model above; the (import) real exchange rate, aid, the terms of trade,
in°ation and the openness of the economy to trade). In addition, and drawing
on other literature in this area, the vector also includes variables to control
for the level of real income and the composition of production and output (see
Leuthold, 1996).
Third, in contrast to the theoretical model, which derives the consequences
of movements in the equilibrium real exchange rate, we examine whether there
is a di®erential e®ect between equilibrium and disequilibrium movements in the
real exchange rate.
Finally, since revenue shares tend to be strongly persistent over time, (16) is
estimated as a ¯rst order dynamic panel data model. To control for the so-called
\Nickell bias" arising from the lagged dependent variable and to control for the
possible endogeneity of aid, the real exchange rate and per capita income we
use a GMM estimator (see Arellano and Bond, 1998). Heteroscedastic robust
standard errors are computed using White's sandwich-estimator. However, this
model, and also the real exchange rate equation reported below, is from the
class of potentially heterogenous dynamic panel models hence the estimates
of the coe±cient vector µj = f®j;¯j;°jg are vulnerable to the aggregation
biases discussed by Pesaran and Smith (1995)7. Given the relatively short
time dimension of the panel the Pesaran and Smith recommendation that the
individualmicro-relations should beestimated separately and the averages of the
estimated micro-parameters calculated explicitly is not feasible in this instance.
However, given the speci¯cation of our model which uses interactive group and
time dummy variables to speci¯cally allow for parameter heterogeneity across
the two exchange rate regimes and time (if not across individual cross-section
units) the extent of this potential bias is likely to be reduced.
Initially we estimate a version of the model which imposes pooling restric-
tions across both country groups and over time, while allowing for country-
speci¯c ¯xed e®ects. Subsequently we re-estimate the model by allowing the
group- and time-pooling restrictions to be relaxed along two axes. The ¯rst is
between CFA and non-CFA countries and the second between the early part of
the sample and the latter part. We handle this by including interactive group
and time dummy variables for the key determinants. First, however, we estimate
the equilibrium and disequilibrium components of the real exchange rate.
4.1 Real exchange rate decomposition
The tax equations discussed above are based on equilibrium movements in the
real exchange rate. However it is widely accepted that across all countries in the
sample there have been periods of substantial real exchange rate misalignment
and it is possible that equilibrium and disequilibrium movements in the real
exchange rate have di®erent consequences for revenue productivity. In order to
investigate this possibility we estimate a model for the long-run real exchange
7Pesaran and Smith note that if there is cross-section heterogeneity in the true coe±cient
vector and if the regressors are serially correlated, coe±cient estimates derived from a pooled
model will be biased and inconsistent and typically cannot be addressed by standard IV
methods.
12rate and use this to decompose changes in the actual real exchange rate into
`equilibrium' and `disequilibrium' components. Given the limitations imposed
by the size of our data panel we do not estimate the model country-by-country
but instead we exploit the panel to de¯ne a region-wide \common" model for the
real exchange rate and use this as the basis for estimation of the equilibrium
and disequilibrium components for each country. The estimating equation is
based on equation (14) above and is estimated on the pooled sample (allowing
for country-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects). In addition to the aid and terms of trade
e®ects we also include as regressors real per capita income (lypc), a measure of
openness to trade and the level of recurrent government consumption (lgy). In
addition, we distinguish between the components of the net resource transfer
by including (the log of) the resource °ow on aid (denoted lga) and (the log
of) interest costs (lin) separately. The ¯rst column of Table 4 reports the
model estimated using a ¯xed e®ects estimator while the second re-estimates
the model by disaggregating the terms of trade. In the third column we use an
instrumental variable estimator to control for the potential endogeneity of the
measure of openness and net disbursements on aid, where the `beta coe±cients'
from column two provide an indication of the relative importance of each of the
regressors.8
*** Table 4 here ***
Although the model is estimated across countries rather than simply over
time it is relatively data coherent and the results conform to the results found in
the time-series literature (see for example Elbadawi, 1994, Elbadawi and Soto,
1997 and Ba®es et al 1999). The model explains a relatively high proportion
of the cross-country variation in the real exchange rate and, moreover, con-
trolling for country-speci¯c e®ects, the data comfortably accept the restriction
that the slope coe±cients are constant across the two nominal exchange rate
regimes. Hence we conclude that our model provides a valid statistical basis for
decomposing the real exchange rate. Turning ¯rst to an interpretation of the
common model we note that, other things equal, the higher the interest bur-
den and the higher the cost of imports, the more depreciated the real exchange
rate. Similarly the results on the openness measure supports the notion that
trade-liberalizing reforms depreciate the real exchange rate. O®setting these
factors income e®ects from higher per capita GDP, higher export prices and
net aid in°ows generate the conventional tendency towards a real exchange rate
appreciation.
Comparing columns 1 and 2 we note that the real exchange response to ex-
port and import price movements is asymmetric: the net terms of trade e®ect is
dominated by movements in export prices. This is consistent with the empirical
literature estimating real exchange rates for small open economies which tends
to ¯nd strong income (and comparatively weak substitution) e®ects associated
with export price movements, especially when the export sector is commodity
based. In our sample, the asymmetry is quite pronounced with import prices
having on average no signi¯cant impact on the real exchange rate implying that




13on average the income and substitution e®ects from changes in the world price
of imports are more equally balanced. Somewhat surprisingly in the light of
existing literature, it would appear that the relationship between government
expenditure and the real exchange rate cannot be established with precision. Fi-
nally, the evidence on the disaggregated components of the net aid °ow suggests
that the real exchange rate responds to a greater degree to increased interest
costs than to net aid °ows. Again this result is consistent with theory: higher
interest costs lead unambiguously to a depreciation of the real exchange rate
while net aid in°ows consist in part of demand side e®ects (strengthening a ten-
dency towards appreciation) but also support the expansion of aggregate supply
which may be expected to have an o®setting e®ect on the real exchange rate,
especially if aid relaxes production or other bottlenecks.9
Given the economic and statistical coherence of the real exchange rate model
we proceed to use it to de¯ne the \long run" or equilibrium real exchange rate
for each country so that deviations from this equilibrium represent the relative
over- or under-valuation of each country's real exchange rate. In the absence of
a full-blown cointegration analysis we de¯ne the equilibrium by ¯tting the ¯nal
model in Table 4 to long-run values of the country-speci¯c explanatory variables
which are computed using the Hodrick-Prescott ¯lter10 and use this measure to
decompose the actual real exchange rate for each country into a measure of the
equilibrium real exchange rate and the misalignment of the actual real exchange
rate from this equilibrium. The equilibrium real exchange rate is denoted lerer
while the measure of misalignment is denoted mis: Both are reported in Ta-
ble 2. By convention a depreciation in the equilibrium real exchange rate is
represented by an increase in lerer: For the misalignment measure, a negative
(positive) value of mis corresponds to an overvaluation (undervaluation) of the
real exchange rate relative to its estimated equilibrium. Thus an increase in the
variable indicates a move from relative over- to under-valuation. Both regions
experienced a steady depreciation in the equilibrium real exchange rate but while
the non-CFA countries eliminated their initially very large misalignment during
the late 1980s, the actual real exchange rate in the CFA zone remained, by our
measure, substantially overvalued throughout the period until the devaluation
in January 1994. Only then was the progressive overvaluation eliminated.
4.2 Revenue equations
We are now ready to examine the revenue equations. Table 5 reports the pre-
liminary results of estimating equation (16) for the three components plus the
aggregate total tax revenue measure under the assumption that revenue be-
9Although not reported here it is possible to show that the balance between these demand
and supply e®ects shifts over time.








with respect to st. In other words the ¯lter minimizes the variance of yt around st subject to
a penalty (determined by the parameter ¸ ) that constrains the second di®erence of st . As
¸ ! 1 the smoothed series st tends to a linear trend while as ¸ ! 0 the ¯lter tends to yt:
We set the smoothing parameter to 100 which is generally agreed to be valid for annual data.
14haviour can be pooled across the exchange rate regimes (although we allow for
country-speci¯c e®ects). These pooled results, which correspond to those esti-
mated by Ghura (1998), establish a benchmark against which we can examine
the consequences of relaxing the assumption of common group e®ects. A num-
ber of regularities emerge from the pooled model. For income taxes, domestic
indirect taxes and total tax revenue the long income elasticity of tax revenue
(i.e. the buoyancy of the tax system) is marginally greater than unity (although
only signi¯cant for income taxes), while for trade taxes the elasticity is slightly
less than unity.11 The agriculture share in total production has a positive (and
marginally signi¯cant) impact on trade taxes but a negative and signi¯cant im-
pact on income tax yields while the industrial share has a positive e®ect on
yields { although this is only signi¯cant in aggregate. Government expenditure
has a positive e®ect on indirect and trade taxes, but no marked e®ect on income
taxes, while openness raises trade taxes and lowers indirect taxes.
*** Table 5 here ***
In°ation e®ects areuniformly negative and relatively signi¯cant across all tax
yields although the e®ect is relatively weak (the long-run point elasticity is in the
region of 0.04 for each component suggesting that a 100% increase in thein°ation
rate (doubling the average in°ation rate from 20% to 40% per annum) would
decrease the revenue yield by around 4 percent (of the yield, not percentage
points). Terms of trade e®ects have a stronger and more signi¯cant impact on
trade taxes (and total taxes) than on indirect and income taxes although the
consequences of a change in the terms of trade are not symmetrical between
falling import prices and rising export prices. Rising export prices improve
(albeit with only a weak signi¯cance) the income- and trade-tax yields while
rising import prices (the case e®ectively analyzed in the model presented above)
have uniformly negative e®ects on revenue yields, and in this case the e®ect is
signi¯cant for trade- and total taxes. This is consistent with the theoretical
model (rising import prices imply a worsening of the terms of trade).
Finally, we turn to the real exchange rate. Since we are already controlling
for the real exchange rate fundamentals, the coe±cients on the real exchange
rate terms represent only the indirect or relative price e®ect of the real exchange
rate on revenue. Recall that an increase in the real exchange rate indicates an
equilibrium depreciation of the real exchange rate whilst an increase in the
misalignment measure similarly measures the elimination of overvaluation (or
accentuation of an undervaluation). Hence, in a casual sense, the signs of these
two variables move together. More surprising is that contrary to the theoretical
model presented in Section 3 a depreciation in the real exchange rate improves
indirect tax yields and worsens the trade tax yield. Moreover this e®ect is
the same (at least in terms of direction) whether we consider equilibrium or
disequilibrium measures of the real exchange rate. One possible explanation for
this peculiar result is that it re°ects an inappropriate aggregation, either across
groups or over time. Our next step is to investigate this possibility, where we
use the pooling results to provide a guide to re-speci¯cation.
11The buoyancy can be de¯nes as (1+¯¤) where ¯¤ denotes the long-run coe±cient on lypc.
At average values of the tax ratios, this translates into a (long-run) partial income elasticity
of the tax share of approximately 0.6 for income taxes, 0.67 for indirect taxes and 0.13 for
total tax revenue. For trade taxes, the sign is reversed: higher real incomes are associated
with a reduced trade tax yield ceteris paribus.
154.2.1 Pooling restrictions
The question we pose is whether the slope coe±cients, the vector ° in equa-
tion (16), are constant over time and between groups. We cannot estimate a
wholly time-varying coe±cients model and therefore we seek a feasible basis for
disaggregation. The cross-section disaggregation between CFA and non-CFA
countries is self-evident. Less clear is how we should examine stability over
time. A natural cleavage to examine is around the middle of the sample (i.e.
the late 1980s) which coincides with substantial adjustment e®orts, especially
by non-CFA countries. However we may also wish to know whether the CFA
devaluation represented a signi¯cant break-point. To re¯ne our speci¯cation, we
employ standard break-point Chow tests using the models estimated in Table
5 in which we allow for a single break to occur in the non-CFA sample in the
window 1986-1992. We follow the same strategy for the CFA countries but in
order to examine whether there is evidence of a break prior to the devaluation
we restrict the sample to 1980-1993 inclusive and the break window to 1986-
1991. We then also allow for a possible break in 1994 arising from the CFA
devaluation. The break point tests, which in this instance are tests of the null
that the conditional variance of the model is constant across the break-point,
suggest that there is signi¯cant non-constancy over time (across the two country
groupings) indicating that the `most likely' break points are after 1989 for the
non-CFA countries and after 1987 for the CFA countries.12 This suggests the
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This disaggregation is used to de¯ne time- and group dummy variables corre-
sponding to each cellof the matrix which we interact with the vector of regressors
X: The baseline is represented by the non-CFA countries for the period 1980-89
and we de¯ne dummy variables for non-CFA countries during the period 1990-96
and the CFA countries over the three time periods. Denoting these as N1, C0,
C1, and C2;the net impact for each time and country group is given in the ¯gure
above. This categorization necessarily increases the dimensionality of the empir-
ical model very signi¯cantly with the attendant costs in terms of the e±ciency
of the estimators. However, as anticipated from Table 5 it is possible to restrict
a large number of the interactive dummy variables to zero (i.e. we can accept
sub-pooling restrictions). In particular, we ¯nd that it is possible to de¯ne a
model that spans the CFA franc devaluation of January 1994 without signi¯cant
12Details of the break-point tests are available on request from the corresponding author.
16loss of information. In other words, controlling for the determinants of revenue
productivity (the values of which may have changed due to the devaluation) and
allowing for the other disaggregations, the data support a constant parameter
model for the CFA countries across the period from 1988 to 1996. To some
extent this result is not surprising: given the relatively short post-devaluation
period we cannot expect to estimate with precision the values of the interactive
terms over this sub-sample. Even so, the point-estimates themselves were also
economically small which leads to our ¯rst main conclusion namely that there
are no statistical grounds for suggesting that the fundamental determinants of
revenue productivity changed substantially as a result of the CFA devaluation,
at least in the short run.
Exploiting this fact, we impose the restriction that the \late" period for the
CFA countries can be de¯ned to run from 1988-96 and re-estimate the model
over four instead of ¯ve sub-categories. Table 6 reports the ¯nal results of an
extensive general-to-speci¯c reduction in which valid pooling restrictions are
imposed. Nonetheless Table 6 contains a huge number of results. To make
sense of these we start by discussing them on a tax-share by tax-share basis,
but in the ¯nal section we pull the results together by relating back to the
key stylized facts discussed in the introduction. By the nature of the chosen
semi-log speci¯cation, where the dependent variable is the tax share, the size
of the marginal e®ects is di±cult to interpret, and therefore Table 7 expresses
the results in terms of \long-run" elasticities evaluated at the mean value of the
variables for each group and time period.13
*** Tables 6 and 7 here ***
4.2.2 Statistical features of the results
The equations in Table 6 ¯t the data substantially better than the raw buoyancy
results in Table 3 and the pooled revenue equations in Table 5. The models,
estimated by GMM, explain 40 and 60 percent of the variation of tax shares
across the sample after conditioning on country-speci¯c unobservable e®ects,
which are strongly signi¯cant across all revenue shares. As we noted, these ¯xed
e®ects re°ect the unobservable time-invariant determinants of the revenue yield
including the stance of the tax structure. Figure 3, which plots the values of the
country-speci¯c ¯xed e®ects (ordered alphabetically within the two exchange
rate regimes starting with the CFA countries) highlights an important feature
of the data. Given that the slope coe±cients di®er between the groups so that
the regression lines are not parallel in the relevant dimensions, the observed
di®erences in the country speci¯c intercepts between the CFA and non-CFA
groups (such as observed for indirect and trade taxes) cannot be extrapolated to
any value of the vector of explanatory variables. For instance, we cannot use this
information to claim that, at the mean of the vector of theindependent variables,
indirect taxes will be higher and trade taxes lower in the CFA compared to the
non-CFA (which we could infer if the slope coe±cients were identical). However,
the Figure does provide evidence to strongly suggest that for total taxes, indirect
13Values for the partial elasticities in Table 7 will therefore di®er either because the semi-
elasticities are di®erent (as indicated in Table 6) or because of the di®erence in the sub-sample
values at which the elasticities are evaluated.
17and trade taxes the amount of within group variation is very low relative to the
between group variation.14
Figure 3.











































































































Although the ¯xed e®ects provide insight into the poolability within the
two country groupings they cannot provide evidence on the evolution over time
of the tax regime, although we do know that there has been a series of trade
liberalizations in both groups of countries. Given that we are modelling the
gross tax yield, trade reforms will necessarily induce an omitted variable bias in
the coe±cients on variables correlated with trade liberalization, particularly net
aid °ows and the openness of the economy. To the extent that tax rates have
been on the `good' side of the tax La®er curve so that trade liberalization would
be expected to lower the average tax yield, the coe±cient on variables positively
correlated with trade liberalization will therefore be biased downwards.
Given that the impulse for tax reform was relatively common across the
continent as a whole, we can argue that the implied time-dummy variables
actually control for the evolution of the tax regime (and hence mitigate the
omitted variable bias problem). F tests against the null that the time dummy
variables are jointly insigni¯cant are reported in Table 6 and indicate that there
is little evidence that time dummies for income or indirect taxes are signi¯cant.
For trade taxes, we reject the null. As Figure 4 shows there is evidence of a
steady decline over time in the trade-tax yield particularly from the late 1980s
onwards. It is reasonable to suggest, therefore, that the time-dummies for the
trade-tax equation control, at least in part, for the unobservable e®ects of trade
reforms.
14This is borne out by standard tests of di®erences in the mean. The t-statistics against
the null of no between groups di®erence are ¡1:44 for income taxes, 71:01 for indirect taxes,
¡25:43 for trade taxes and 7:31 for total taxes.
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Finally the Sargan tests suggest that we have a valid set of instruments
for the endogenous variables (the lagged dependent variable, net aid °ows and
openness) and that the model is free from signi¯cant error auto-correlation,
suggesting that the GMM estimators are consistent and asymptotically e±cient
(although given the short time-dimension of the sample these tests are likely to
have relatively low power).
4.2.3 Revenue shares
Total tax share We start our discussion of the ¯nal results by focussing on
the structural determinants of total tax revenue (income and the structure of
production) before turning to the role of the real exchange rate and its de-
terminants. Given the semi-log functional form of the revenue equations it is
convenient to express the income elasticity of revenue in terms of a (partial)
buoyancy measure with respect to per capita real income.15 Buoyancy in both
country groups is signi¯cantly in excess of unity although for the non-CFA coun-
tries there is evidence of a slight decline over time. Given this, however, the
composition of production matters: total tax productivity is decreasing in the
agricultural share over time and increasing in the industry share, although the
former e®ect is generally stronger than the latter. The results on the openness
of the economy are interesting: the trade share in total output has a strongly
positive (but weakening over time) e®ect in the CFA countries but is not signif-
icant in determining total tax revenue in the non-CFA countries. As we shall
see below, this appears to re°ect features of the aggregation.
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19Turning to the factors more central to this paper, we note the following.
First, the e®ect of in°ation is signi¯cant across all countries and over time. The
semi-elasticity of in°ation is constant across countries (Table 6) implying that
in all countries a unit increase in the in°ation rate has the same e®ect on the
tax yield. However, given that the level of in°ation varies substantially across
countries and over time, this common semi-elasticity translates into variation
in the full in°ation elasticity ranging from -0.05 in the non-CFA countries to
-0.01 in the CFA zone. These magnitudes are relatively low: for the non-CFA
countries a doubling of the in°ation rate from its mean value of 25% would
reduces the total tax yield by around four percent of its mean yield or 0.6
percentages points of GDP.
The e®ect of the terms of trade is also broadly comparable across the country
groups although the size of the e®ect is more pronounced in the CFA countries.
Consider ¯rst the non-CFA countries. During the 1980s there appeared to be
no systematic response of total revenue to movements in the terms of trade
in the non-CFA countries. This changes, however, as we move into the later
period. Here a 10% improvement in the terms of trade in both regions (for
example through an equi-proportionate increase in the export price index and
a fall in the import price index) would generate an improvement in the tax
share of around 6% (of its mean value). For the CFA countries the e®ect is
more stable throughout the whole sample although there is a small increase
in the elasticity (from around 0.6 in the early 1980s to around 0.8 in the late
1980s and 1990s). That these e®ects appear signi¯cant only in the latter part
of the period may re°ect the sharp move away from quantitative restrictions
on international trade which dominated many trade regimes in the early 1980s.
These e®ects are not, however, symmetric nor are they consistent over time.
For the non-CFA countries (and the CFA prior to 1988) higher export prices are
associated with higher overall tax and rising import prices with lower revenue,
but the latter e®ect is marginally stronger. This asymmetry re°ects both the
di®erential taxation of exports and imports but also the di®erential taxation of
imports and domestic production in the presence of substitution in consumption
between imports and domestic goods. If domestic production is taxed at a lower
rate on average than imports then substitution away from imports will reduce
total revenue. For the CFA countries post-1988, the response to movements in
export prices is greatly increased while a rise in import prices actually appears
to increase revenue. The peculiarity of these results will be explored in more
detail below when we examine the disaggregated tax shares.
The role of government consumption expenditure also di®ers signi¯cantly
between country groups. During the 1980s government expenditure in the non-
CFA countries has a positive e®ect on the tax yield (with a marginal elasticity
of 0.3) but by the 1990s this e®ect had declined to less than 0.07. By contrast
higher government expenditure has been negatively associated with total tax
revenue in the CFA zone. As the disaggregation by tax components suggests,
most of the explanation for this di®ering behaviour lies in the behaviour of
indirect taxes. By contrast with non-CFA countries where both indirect and
trade tax revenue is increasing in the level of government expenditure, indirect
tax revenue is reducing in the level of government expenditure, ceteris paribus,
suggesting that in the CFA zone government expenditure is disproportionately
exempt from indirect taxes.
Although net aid in°ows had no signi¯cant e®ect on total tax revenue in the
20CFA countries or, indeed, in non-CFA countries in the 1980s, there is evidence
of a small positive e®ect for the latter group in the 1990s. Recall that since
we are controlling for the relative price e®ect of the real exchange rate and the
trade share in GDP in this equation, the coe±cient on net aid measures only
the direct resource-transfer e®ect of the aid °ow.
Finally we consider the role of the real exchange rate. Here the e®ects are
particularly interesting { even though they may be slightly counterintuitive. A
depreciation in the equilibrium real exchange rate has a positive (and increasing)
e®ect on total tax revenue in the non-CFAcountries. In other words, the relative
price e®ect from the average equilibrium depreciation in the real exchange rate
had a powerful positive impact on revenue. Contrast this trajectory with the
CFA zone. Real exchange rate depreciations in these countries tends to worsen
total tax revenue, while removal of real exchange rate disequilibrium also reduces
the tax yield (for reasons noted below). This is a dramatic di®erence, but one
which would appear to be explicable only when we examine the behaviour of
the components of total taxation.
Disaggregated tax shares To fully understand the di®erential revenue per-
formance between the two regions, it is useful to examine the components of
total tax in more detail: these can be examined from columns 2 to 4 of Table
7. The ¯rst important conclusion is that very little of the overall di®erence in
the revenue functions can be explained by di®erences in the income tax equa-
tions. Hence the structural e®ects (the income elasticity and the structure of
production), are relatively similar and consistent across time and country groups
although they appear to be somewhat more important for the CFA zone. The
level of government expenditure is not a signi¯cant determinant nor, as sug-
gested by the theoretical model above, does aid have a signi¯cant impact on the
income tax yield. However for all countries the in°ation e®ect is negative and
signi¯cant. Neither terms of trade e®ects nor movements in the equilibrium real
exchange rate a®ect income tax yields in the non-CFA countries (again as the
theoretical model would suggest). For the CFA countries, not only do move-
ments in the terms of trade appear to be signi¯cant, but the real exchange e®ect
is strongly positive in the 1980-87 period although it weakens substantially in
the later period. Given that over the early period the real exchange rate was
appreciating (a reduction in the value of lerer) this implies a reduction in the
tax yield ceteris paribus. The semi-elasticity of the misalignment measure is also
constant across all countries, although since the average misalignment is falling
in the non-CFA countries over time and rising in the CFA (at least up to 1994)
the misalignment e®ect is somewhat larger in the latter group. Recalling that
an increase in the variable mis represents a movement from being more to less
overvalued, this suggests that a movement towards equilibrium hurts income
tax revenue.
Having said this, we really only begin to get a clear picture of how the two
zones di®er when we look at the results for indirect taxes and for taxes on
trade. The ¯rst interesting point is that for indirect taxes, with the exception of
the real exchange rate e®ects on trade taxes, the CFA models exhibit constant
parameters over time (we can restrict all the interaction terms for the late CFA
period to zero). Di®erences in the point elasticities therefore re°ect changing
values of the dependent and independent variables only.
21The second important feature of these results is the way in which factors
leading to improvements in revenue performance in non-CFA countries are not
re°ected in the CFA country groups. This is seen most clearly through the e®ect
of the real exchange rate on trade tax yields. As suggested in the theoretical
model, a depreciation in the real exchange rate will lead to an increase in the
trade tax yield for su±ciently large elasticities of supply for non-tradables. The
results suggest that over time the trade tax revenue yield in the non-CFA zone
has become signi¯cantly more responsive to movements in the (equilibrium)
real exchange but this has not been the case for CFA countries. This increased
°exibility works both ways: while non-CFA countries enjoy relative revenue
gains in the presence of a depreciation in the real exchange rate their trade
tax revenue will fall faster than in the CFA countries as the real exchange rate
appreciates.
The third feature of the results is the distinctly di®erent response of domestic
indirect taxes to equilibrium and disequilibrium movements in the real exchange
rate between the two groups of countries. Real exchange rate depreciations
(both equilibrium and misalignment) tend to increase the indirect tax yield
for the non-CFA countries but to decrease the tax yield for CFA countries,
suggesting that in the CFA the tax base is dominated by non-tradables relative
to that in the non-CFA countries. In a system where non-tradables constitute
a large proportion of the tax base, and especially in the peculiar institutional
setting of the CFA zone where neither expenditure switching nor expenditure
reduction is required to sustain external balance, the revenue system will exhibit
high buoyancy when the real exchange rate appreciates (and over appreciates).
However when expenditure reduction is accompanied by a devaluation of the real
exchange rate the revenue yield will collapse sharply. This stands in contrast to
a system where tradable goods dominate the tax base and where the e®ects of
expenditure switching and expenditure reduction o®set each other.
The disaggregation also provides some insight into the evidence from the
total tax yield results that indicated poorly de¯ned e®ects of net aid °ows.
Controlling for the relative price e®ects, it would appear that net aid in°ows
have no impact on trade tax yields but they do have an e®ect on indirect taxes.
In the early part of the sample there was a clear tendency for indirect tax
revenue to decline in the presence of increased net aid °ows. This tendency has
continued for the CFA countries (and indeed has strengthened slightly) but has
been reversed in the non-CFA countries so that post 1989 we observe a small
overall positive aid elasticity. Two factors are likely to be important. On the one
hand, the 1980s saw a switch away from aid as project support (in which case
aid-¯nanced imports were frequently tax and duty free) towards programme aid
in which aid °ows ¯nanced private sector imports that were not tax and duty
free. Supporting this switch was a general move to close tax and duty exemption
loopholes on aid projects in general.
Perhaps the most confusing results to interpret concern the terms of trade.
We noted above that the total tax yield is positively related to the terms of
trade. The results for the non-CFA countries are consistent with this outcome
and re°ect the predictions of the theoretical model: an increase in the terms of
trade improves the trade tax yield,deteriorates the indirect tax yield, and has
no measurable impact on the income tax yield. When we consider the separate
e®ects of movements in export and import prices, the picture becomes less clear.
For trade taxes the results suggest that rising export prices improve trade tax
22revenue while the world price elasticity of substitution in consumption of imports
is su±ciently strong to lower trade tax revenue. Turning to indirect taxes we
note that rising import prices raise indirect taxes which is consistent with the
strong price elasticity of substitution in consumption away from imports. At
least initially, however, rising export prices reduce indirect tax revenue.
For the CFA countries the results are less clear. For both trade taxes and
indirect taxes the net terms of trade e®ect is negative. This raises at least two
puzzles. The ¯rst is that according to the theoretical model we would not expect
to see the same response of indirect and trade taxes to a terms of trade change,
and the second is simply that the sign of the terms of trade e®ect suggests that
the sharp decline in the terms of trade that occurred during the period should
have bene¯tted rather than harmed the CFA countries. One reason why this
may not have been the case is suggested by the two components of the terms
of trade. We noted above that for the non-CFA countries rising import prices
worsen trade tax revenue through a strong price elasticity of substitution in
consumption from tradables to non-tradables. For the CFA countries, however,
it would appear that this substitution e®ect is weak (possibly re°ecting the high
level of integration with the French economy) so that rising world prices raise
trade tax revenue, with the corollary that the tax spillover to indirect taxes
will be correspondingly weaker. Reinforcing this e®ect, however, it appears
that rising export prices reduce both trade and indirect tax yields, weakly in
the case of trade taxes but quite strongly in the case of indirect taxes. It is
this latter e®ect which dominates the overall terms of trade e®ect on indirect
taxes. There are a number of mechanism through which rising (falling) export
prices may lead to falling (rising) trade and indirect tax revenue (controlling for
the revaluation e®ects of movements in the real exchange rate), including the
structure of export taxation and the input intensity of production in export and
non-export sectors. Unfortunately the lack of data on either limits our ability
to unpick this particular result.
5 Summary and conclusions
The results presented in Tables 6 and 7 are comprehensive but somewhat over-
whelming. To provide a more coherent summary of the results we return to
Figure 1 and pose the following question: how much of the di®erence in the tax
yield can be attributed to \external factors" and how much to the response of
the CFA countries to the changing external environment. We tackle this issue by
constructing three simple counterfactual scenarios which allow us to decompose
the gap between the average revenue yields in the two country groups. The
three counterfactuals are illustrated in Figure 5. Using the subscripts C and N
to denote CFA and non-CFA countries the (implied) models of the tax yield in
CFA and non-CFA countries can be written as
^ yC = ^ ¯CXC and ^ yN = ^ ¯NXN (17)
respectively. The ¯rst counterfactual asks how the average outcomes in the
CFA countries would have di®ered had these countries been confronted with the
environment prevailing in non-CFA countries. Counterfactual 1 is thus de¯ned
23as
^ yCF1
C = ^ ¯CXN (18)
and partitions the tax gap (^ yN ¡^ yC) into two components. The ¯rst is the area
below the counterfactual line, equal to ^ ¯C(XN ¡XC); which provides a measure
of the amount of the revenue gap explained by di®erences in the environment,
broadly de¯ned to encompass all the explanatory variables de¯ned by the vector
X in (16). The area above the line, equal to (^ ¯N ¡ ^ ¯C)XN; measures, in some
crude sense, di®erences in policy responses to the same environment. Through
this partition, it would appear that by the mid-1990s approximately half the
revenue gap could be explained by di®erence is the \environment", and half as
a result of \behavioural" responses to these di®erences in the environment.
Counterfactual 1 implicitly assumes that all the elements of the vector X
are exogenous to the policy process. Certainly the vector contains structural
characteristics, such as the composition of production, the terms of trade, the
level of per capita income and the equilibrium real exchange rate which are
independent of the conduct of macroeconomic policy, at least in the short-
run. However X also contains factors more closely under the control of the
authorities including the rate of in°ation and the degree of misalignment of the
real exchange rate. In Counterfactual 2 we therefore isolate the contribution of
the di®erence in the environment made by these so-called \policy factors" from
the structural factors. We de¯ne the counterfactual as
^ yCF2
C = ^ ¯CXC + ^ ¯CP(XNP ¡ XCP) (19)
where the subscript P denotes the policy components of X. Counterfactual 2
thus measures the contribution of the policy stance to total tax revenue per-
formance. Roughly speaking, when the CF2 lies below the actual trajectory of
CFA tax revenue the actual policy stance of the CFA countries worked in their
own favour, and vice versa when CF2 lies above actual revenue. Thus in the
early 1980s the lower in°ation and lower real exchange rate misalignment in
the CFA zone implied total revenue was higher (to the tune of 0.75% of GDP)
than it would have been if these variables were at the average values of the
non-CFA countries. From the mid-1980s until the CFA devaluation in 1994,
even though in°ation was still lower within the CFA than outside, the persis-
tent misalignment of the real exchange rate in the CFA zone at a time when
non-CFA countries were rapidly eliminating the most egregious misalignment
worked to the CFA's disadvantage, lowering by 0.75% of GDP the actual rev-
enue yield relative to the counterfactual. With the devaluation of 1994 and the
fall in in°ation in the non-CFAs the di®erence between the two groups becomes
negligible, although because of still lower average in°ation there is a modest
gain in favour of the CFA countries.
So far we have maintained the assumption that the behavioural response of
the di®erent country groups to their environment, broadly de¯ned, is given. As
we noted in the introduction it was suggested that the institutional features of
the CFA franc zone contributed to the in°exibility of the regime in response to
(common) external changes, most importantly in the equilibrium real exchange
rate. To conclude our analysis of the results we therefore consider a third coun-
terfactual in which we assume that the CFA countries responded to movements
24in the equilibrium real exchange rate in the same fashion as occurred in the non-
CFA countries. Letting the subscript R denote the equilibrium real exchange
rate, this counterfactual is then de¯ned as
^ yCF3
C = ^ ¯CXN +(^ ¯NR ¡ ^ ¯CR)XNR (20)
= ^ yCF1
C + (^ ¯NR ¡ ^ ¯CR)XNR
In this case there is a signi¯cant increase in the counterfactual tax yield, con-
tributing in excess of an additional one percentage point of GDP by the end of
the period. In fact, Counterfactual 3 generates a tax yield that is higher than
that observed for the non-CFA countries by the very end of the period.16
Figure 5. 
























Actual NCFA Actual CFA Counterfactual 1 Counterfactual 2 Counterfactual 3
 
Table 8 repeats this analysis for the individual components of the total tax
yield where for convenience we have taken sub-period averages over the full
sample. Each row of the table measures the marginal contribution to revenue
in the CFA countries as a percentage of GDP under the three counterfactuals,
where a positive (negative) value indicates the increase (decrease) relative to
the actual outturn that would have been enjoyed by the average CFA economy.
Although these counterfactuals are necessarily crude { not least since we
make strong assumptions about the exogeneity of the independent variables in-
cluding real GDP { three main conclusions emerge from Figure 5 and Table
8. The ¯rst is that di®erences in structure taken crudely account for a large
proportion of the di®erence in revenue performance, given the structure of taxes
in the two regions. By the mid-1990s di®erences in structure accounted for ap-
proximately 63% of the total revenue gap. The second important conclusion is
that our results bear out Nashashibi and Bazzoni's (1994) conjecture concerning
the behaviour of CFA revenue performance in the late 1980s which motivated
16This simply re°ects the fact that the CFA response to the remaining determinants of total
revenue is, in some sense, \more favourable" than that of the non-CFA countries.
25this paper. Although there were initial revenue gains from low in°ation these
were progressively o®set by increasing real exchange rate misalignment, which
reached a peak in the early 1990s before the devaluation of the CFA Franc. In-
deed, over the middle decade of our sample, 1983-92, our second counterfactual
suggests that the CFA revenue yield would have been more or less stationary in
the absence of di®erential misalignment and in°ation instead of actually falling
by around 1.5 percent of GDP. This e®ect is seen to work most strongly through
the e®ect on trade and indirect taxes which, combined, would have been about
0.5 percent of GDP higher in the late 1980s had the CFA countries been able
to limit the growing misalignment.17 Over the entire sample period, however,
although these policy factors had a poweful e®ect on the time path of revenue
they had no signi¯cant impact on the cumulative decline in the total revenue
yield. Finally, these results suggest that the di®erential response to movements
in the equilibrium real exchange rate does matter for revenue, adding up to
around an additional 1.5 percent of GDP to revenue performance.
Table 8. Counterfactual changes in CFA tax yields.
1980-86 1987-93 1994-96
Tax [ percent of GDP ]
Total Taxes
Structure [CF1] 0.24 2.02 2.47
Policy[CF2] -0.75 0.74 -0.18
ERER[CF3] 0.76 1.32 1.43
Income Taxes
Structure[CF1] 0.14 0.51 0.56
Policy[CF2] -0.07 -0.03 -0.08
ERER[CF3] -0.06 -0.09 -0.09
Domestic Indirect
Structure[CF1] 0.28 0.26 -0.04
Policy[CF2] -0.28 0.25 -0.14
ERER[CF3] 0.12 0.79 0.69
Trade Taxes
Structure[CF1] 0.63 1.87 1.78
Policy[CF2] -0.07 0.24 0.10
ERER[CF3] 0.00 0.46 0.23
The capacity of the arrangements embodied in the CFA Franc zone to deliver
consistently reduced in°ation relative to other countries in sub-Saharan Africa
has featured prominently in discussions of their relative merits for many years.
More recently, there has been much interest in their possible role in inducing
cumulative distortions, especially misalignment of the real exchange rate. The
data presented earlier in this paper demonstrate the continuing truth of the
proposition concerning in°ation. They also underline two other important dif-
ferences in performance between the two groups of countries, where by contrast
17Note that this ¯gure, in fact, understates the pure cost of misalignment since at the time
CFA in°ation was still lower than in the non-CFA countries.
26the non CFA countries have outperformed the CFA ones: they have generated
growing as opposed to falling per capita incomes, and they have sustained the
share of tax revenues in GDP as opposed to seeing this fall. We have had noth-
ing to say about the ¯rst of these outcomes, but have focussed on the second. It
has previously been conjectured that the CFA arrangements not only resulted
in exchange rate misalignment but that this misalignment had itself caused the
revenue decline.
In this paper we have derived estimates of equilibrium real exchange rates
and hence of the extent of misalignment, which broadly support the ¯rst con-
tention. Speci¯cally, the non CFA countries were able during the 1980s to rectify
their initial very high real overvaluation, whereas this increased, albeit from a
low initial level, for the CFA countries, up until the devaluation of 1994. Perhaps
more importantly, allowing for country speci¯c e®ects, we found that we could
pool across the two types of nominal exchange rate regimes: the way in which
the fundamentals determine the equilibrium exchange rate is common to both
groups of countries, as theory would suggest. The CFA institutions would then
have their di®erential impact via di®erent in°ation, di®erent misalignment and
other mechanisms, but not via a shift in the relation between the fundamentals
and the equilibrium real exchange rate.
We then proceeded to investigate the second contention concerning the link
between the real exchange rate and revenue performance, ¯rst in a simple the-
oretical model, and then econometrically. We examined to what extent the
di®erential - and relatively poor - revenue performance of the CFA countries
could be attributed to three di®erent groups of factors. The ¯rst comprised
di®erences in structure and in the economic environment experienced by the
two groups of countries (and hence inter alia in their equilibrium real exchange
rates), the second comprised di®erences in policy factors associated with the
exchange rate regime, such as in°ation and misalignment, and the third con-
cerned di®erences in their revenue responses to changes in the equilibrium real
exchange rate. Our conclusion was that structural and environmental factors
were very important, explaining well over half the discrepancy, and that during
the early 1990s the failure to eliminate exchange rate misalignment contributed
a large proportion of this shortfall. Finally, we suggested that di®erential be-
havioural responses to the same movements in the equilibrium real exchange
rate were also important, accounting for 15-30% of the discrepancy: these pre-
sumably re°ect other institutional di®erences between the CFA countries and
the rest, over and above those speci¯c to nominal exchange rate management.
There are of course a multitude of reasons for wishing to minimize both
in°ation and exchange rate misalignment, and it does seem to be true that
CFA-type arrangements involve a trade-o® between them. From the narrow
but important perspective of revenue productivity, these results suggest that
reduced in°ation and increased misalignment at the magnitudes associated with
the CFA zone can have signi¯cant temporary revenue consequences. However
the poor cumulative revenue performance of the CFA countries over the entire
period appears to result mainly from a di®erent evolution of environmental and
structural features and also from the di®erent (institutionally determined) ways
in which revenue responds to this evolution. The exchange rate regime itself
does not seem to have been of central importance to this cumulative story.
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6 Appendix
Equations (6 , 7, and 9) de¯ne the macroeconomic balance, non-tradable equi-
librium, and the public sector balance respectively. Totally di®erentiating these
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28where ª = ¡[d¯¼ +t®¼(1+T(1¡Á)RT)+Á°¼(T(1¡Á)RT +A)]: Letting the
determinant of the inverse matrix be
¢ = ¡[EUeu(eQQ + EQQ ¡RQQ)
+(EUeQu ¡ euEQU)(¿1(RQ + QRQQ) +¿2T(1 ¡Á)RT ¡ eQ)




[feuEQU ¡ (euEQU ¡EUeQu)Á(1 ¡ °(¼))gdA
+feuEQU(1 ¡Á)RT ¡Eueu(1 ¡Á)RTQ
¡(euEQU ¡ EUeQu)(¿1QRQT +¿2(1 ¡Á)(RT + TRTT)gdT
¡f(euEQU ¡EUeQu)ªgd¼]: (A2)





+¿2T(1 ¡ Á)RT ¡ eQ)(dy ¡Dy) +((eQQ + EQQ ¡ RQQ)]: (A3)
Using this expression (A2) simpli¯es directly to (14).
6.1 Data appendix
Data on revenue components are from IMF sta® estimates made available to the
authors and from the IMF \Government Financial Statistics" (various issues).
Revenue categories correspond to the standard GFS classi¯cations as follows:
ytax = lines 1+2+3+4 ; itax= line 5; ttax= line 6; ntax = lines 7+8+9+12;
txrev = ytax + itax +ttax; trev = ttax + ntax. Data on nominal exchange rates
and domestic and world prices were collected from IMF \International Financial
Statistics" (lines rh , 64, and USA line 63 respectively). Data on income, the
structure of production and consumption, world import and export prices and
the terms of trade were collected from the World Bank WDI data base. Aid
°ows and interest payments are from World Debt Tables. The data used in the
econometric analysis are as follows:
lrer (log) actual real exchange rate (using o±cial exchange rate)
lerer (log) equilibrium real exchange rate
mis misalignment index (higher values denote less misalignment
in° annual in°ation
lga (log) aid °ows net of amortization
lin (log) interest payments on o±cial debt
naid (log) net transfers on aid (lga-lin)
ag y agricultural share in GDP
ind y industry (incl mining) share in GDP
lop (log) openness: trade as a share of GDP
lypc (log) real per capita income
ltot (log) terms of trade
lpm (log) import price index
lpx (log) export price index
lgy (log) government consumption
29The Country classi¯cation is as follows:
1. CFA. This group combines members of the BCEAO and BEAC
maintaining a ¯xed nominal exchange rate with the French Franc
( Benin ; Burkina Faso; Central African Republic; Cote d'Ivoire ;
Mali; Niger; Senegal ; Togo).
2. Non-CFA. This group consists of countries predominantly from
Anglophone Africa. In many cases the countries adopted a unilateral
¯xed exchange rate regime, usually with the US dollar, throughout
some or all of the period (Burundi; The Gambia; Ghana; Kenya;
Madagascar; Mauritania; Malawi; Mauritius; Rwanda; Sierre Leone;
Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe).
3. Countries excluded from the sample: (i) countries whose
tax base is dominated by natural resources, mainly oil producing
countries - Gabon, Cameroon, Congo, Nigeria, Botswana; (ii) coun-
tries for which there were insu±cient or dubious data over the sam-
ple period - Namibia, Swaziland, Lesotho, Mozambique, Angola,
Zaire, Reunion, Comoros, Seychelles, Ethiopia, Sudan, Sao Tome &
Principe, Liberia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde; (iii) South
Africa.
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